

#### Studying Leakages on an Embedded Biometric System Using Side Channel Analysis

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- Fingerprint standard representation.
- Generic biometric system & vulnerabilities.





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- Description of the targeted computation.
- SCA approach & results.

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
#### 4- Countermeasures.

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## The INCITS 378 and the ISO 19794-2 standards


A fingerprint contains different types of ridge patterns and other kind of minutiae.





## The INCITS 378 and the ISO 19794-2 standards


A fingerprint contains different types of ridge patterns and other kind of minutiae.



#### *Compact version of the standard:*

•Two types of minutiae are considered :

- Ridge ending
- Ridge bifurcation.
- Fingerprint can be considered as a set of points  $(x, y, \theta, t)$
- In this study type is not used
  - $S = \{(x_{0}, y_{0}, \theta_{0}), \dots, (x_{n}, y_{n}, \theta_{n})\}$




Fingerprint image

Standard representation



## **Generic Biometric System**

- Four main modules:
- The Sensor for finger image acquisition.
- The **Feature extractor** producing the minutiae set.
- The **Matcher** computing the similarity level.
- The **Database** storing the reference set(s).




Biometric authentication system with four main modules





The Match On Card embeds the matcher and the reference set within embedded system.



The Biometric Match-On-Smart-Card



#### **MOC System**

The Match On Card embeds the matcher and the reference set within embedded system.

#### Advantage:


Takes advantage from the tamper resistance of the Smart-card.

#### Challenges:

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Limitation of available resources:

- Constrained memory footprint.
- Low speed CPU.




The Biometric Match-On-Smart-Card



## **Vulnerability Points of Biometric Systems**

- (1) Using false finger.
- (2) Biasing the sensor.
- (3) Forcing the extractor.
- (4) Intercepting and modifying the input vector.
- (5) Spying or forcing the comparator computation.
- (6) Tampering with the reference set.
- (7) Intercepting the reference set.
- (8) Overriding the final decision.




Vulnerabilities of generic biometric systems



## Vulnerabilities of MOC System

The Analysis is done on an FPGA prototype:

- System On Chip
- Independent biometric co-processor.




Finger

MOC prototype

## **The Hill Climbing Heuristic**

The HC aims at optimizing the similarity score iteratively by applying random modifications.

If (score > Threshold)  $\rightarrow$  Successful authentication.






## **The Hill Climbing Heuristic**

**Basic countermeasure:** output a binary decision only (accepted/rejected).

 $\rightarrow$  <u>The feedback is of **low** entropy</u>.

If (score > Threshold)  $\rightarrow$  Successful authentication.






## SCA on the similarity Score


By means of SCA, access to information about internal score.

 $\rightarrow$  *The feedback is of high entropy.* 



If (score > Threshold)  $\rightarrow$  Successful authentication





The algorithm flowchart



## **The Score Normalization**

- The score normalization is *common* to many biometric algorithms.
- It considers the size of the compared fingerprints.
- In our case:

$$Score = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^{size_{in}} pair[i]}{\text{Max}(size_{in}, size_{ref})}$$




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
$$Score = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^{size_{in}} pair[i]}{\text{Max}(size_{in}, size_{ref})}$$

• Hardware Implementation:




#### **Template analysis**

Retrieval of the score is done bit per bit by means of template analysis.



#### Profiling phase:

• The *Correlation(Val\_bit, L)* allows the localization of each bit leakage moment.



#### Localization of leakage moments



## **Template analysis (results)**

**Profiling phase:** Profiling of each bit of the score.

$$\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{S}_i} = \{\mu_{\mathcal{S}_i}, Cov_{\mathcal{S}_i}\}$$

Analysis phase: Computation of the Likelihood coefficient.

$$p(\mathcal{L}_j|\mu_{S_i}, Cov_{S_i}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^N |Cov|}} \times e^{-\frac{1}{2}(\mathcal{L}_j - \mu_{S_i})^T Cov^{-1}(\mathcal{L}_j - \mu_{S_i})}.$$



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
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**<u>PCA</u>**: During both phases the principal component is used.


#### <u>Results:</u>

- Number of required traces differ for each bit.
- 34 traces are required per score extraction.



#### Success rate





The matching algorithm




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Enhancement of the HC consists in:

(1)Retrieval of the reference set size

 $\rightarrow$  Optimal score normalization.



The matching algorithm




Enhancement of the HC consists in:

(1)Retrieval of the reference set size

 $\rightarrow$  Optimal score normalization.

(2)Retrieval of partial coordinates.

 $\rightarrow$  Reduction of the synthesis coordinates set.




The matching algorithm




## **SPA** on the Pairing phase

**The pairing: Exhaustive** one to one comparison between minutiae of the compared fingerprints.




The pairing phase duration is correlated to the reference set size



#### The matching algorithm



The registration:




The algorithm flowchart



#### The registration:

• Construction of a histogram of differences between each possible (*Ref, input*) minutiae pair.




The algorithm flowchart



#### The registration:

- Construction of a histogram of differences between each possible (*Ref, input*) minutiae pair.
- A straightforward implementation requires resources beyond what is available in actual smart-cards.
- $\rightarrow$  Hardware adaptation.




#### The algorithm flowchart



#### Algorithmic adaptation:

(1) Iterative and partial constructions of the histogram  $(\Delta_{\theta} \text{ is processed in } an incremental sequence)$ 




The algorithm adaptation





#### Algorithmic adaptation:

- (1) Iterative and partial constructions of the histogram  $(\Delta_{\theta} \text{ is processed in } an incremental sequence)$
- (2) Usage of a *fingerprint map* to speedup the minutia search.




The algorithm adaptation





#### Algorithmic adaptation:

- (1) Iterative and partial constructions of the histogram (△ is processed in an incremental sequence)
- (2) Usage of a *fingerprint map* to speedup the minutia search.
- $\rightarrow$ The order in which the reference set is read in depends on (1) and (2).




The algorithm adaptation





## SPA on the registration

#### Due to missing angles, distinguishable patterns in the power consumption are observed.



Pattern positions in the leakage traces




pattern.

## SPA on the registration

#### Second observation:


The duration of the shifts is correlated to the number of minutiae per angle for a particular angle.





Number of iterations is reduced by nearly half.

• For the following example, 4000 iterations are required.



Reduction of the number of iterations required for HC



## The Countermeasures (1): The Score

Straightforward normalization :

In order to produce a binary answer:
(1) The score is computed.
(2) Compared to a <u>fixed</u> threshold.

$$Score = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^{size_{in}} pair[i]}{\text{Max}(size_{in}, size_{ref})}$$



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Straightforward normalization :

In order to produce a binary answer:
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$$Score = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^{size_{in}} pair[i]}{\text{Max}(size_{in}, size_{ref})}$$

#### Dynamic threshold :

*The score is not normalized! The threshold is <u>dynamically</u> adjusted.* 


$$\begin{aligned} AccuScore &= \sum_{i=0}^{size_{in}} pair[i] \\ DyScore_{Th} &= Score_{Th} \times Max(size_{in}, size_{ref}) \\ \textbf{if } DyScore_{Th} &\leq AccuScore \textbf{ then} \\ &\mid \text{ Answer } = 1 \\ \textbf{else} \\ &\mid \text{ Answer } = 0 \\ \textbf{end} \end{aligned}$$



## The Countermeasures (2): HC Enhancements

#### Masking the pairing duration:

- Random padding during the pairing phase.
- Constant duration of the pairing.




The pairing phase duration can be randomly padded.



## The Countermeasures (2): HC Enhancements

#### Masking the pairing duration:

- Random padding during the pairing phase.
- Constant duration of the pairing.



The pairing phase duration can be randomly padded.

#### Masking the angle sequence:

Construction of histogram can be done in any random order.

for rot\_a=0 to NB\_MAX\_ANGLE-1 do
 use(rot\_a) ...
end

Sequence order of the angle process

mask = generate\_random\_number()
for rot\_a=0 to NB\_MAX\_ANGLE-1 do
 m\_rot\_a = rot\_a ⊕ mask
 use(m\_rot\_a) ...

#### end

Random order of the angle process







## The presented work is funded by the ANR project BMOS



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# Thank you for your attention




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
## How to identify a fingerprint?

Different ridges shapes with 3 resolution levels.

*Level 1:* Global ridges shape forming <u>Core</u> and <u>delta</u>.



Level 2: local ridge shapes i.e. Minutiae



Dot Ridge ending Pores



Level 3: High definition details, pores, dotes...

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